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It hardly needs to be said that this is not a good time to view the fate of animal 
domestication with great hope or satisfaction. While companion species may enjoy 
certain privileges, especially when their human handlers live amidst relative 
abundance, those animals which are valued for their flesh or other parts tend to be 
denied such creature comforts. Market-driven pressures to minimize inputs and 
maximize outputs of animal bodies have led to increasingly industrialized agricultural 
practices in which technologies of control and modification are applied to ever more 
intimate aspects of biological being. Factory farming, doses of growth hormones and 
antibiotics, genetic modification: this is the price animal domesticates pay for our 
savings at the supermarket checkout.  As philosopher Jacques Derrida claims, `no 
one can deny the unprecedented proportions of this subjection of the animal …. 
Everyone knows what the production, breeding, transport, and slaughter of these 
animals has become' (2002: 394).  
 If such forms of violence or violation are difficult to stomach when this 
processing of animal bodies proceeds according to plan, there is worse to behold 
when the system breaks down. With what appears to be growing regularity, diseases 
are breaking out amongst farmed animals. Foot and mouth disease in the UK, 
France, Brazil and much of East Asia, avian flu in numerous outbreaks over several 
continents: each new epidemic accompanied by the extermination of the infected or 
at-risk animal population. Ending in mass burnings and anonymous burials, these 
events are an unpleasant reminder how far `domestication' has strayed from its 
association with the cosy hearth and sheltering enclosures of the domus.  
What are we to make of this dark underbelly of our desire for frequent, 
affordable flesh? One way of looking at domestication is to see it as a shortening and 
tightening of nutrient cycles: an imposition of `efficiency' that seeks to exclude links in 
the food chain that come between human consumers and those living things they 
wish to  consume (De Landa, 1997: 08). Viewed in this way, domestication appears 
as an anticipation or prototype of the kind of `economic' logic that is a definitive 
feature of the era we call `modernity’. There are many ways of defining what it is to 
be `modern’, but to put it simply we might say that it is a way of thinking and doing 
that likes to know its goals, and sets out to attain them in the most efficient and 
speedy manner. To live in this way, as Michel Foucault put it, is to impose a `grid of 
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intelligibility' on the world from which nothing is supposed to escape (1990: 93). It is 
to apply a calculus to life and labour such that the value of all things can be known 
and the costs or benefits of any action discerned - preferably in advance.   
Over recent decades these contours of modernity have come into sharper 
focus, though more often from its failures than its successes. Much has been said 
about the way that the modern quest for order, clarity and mastery has undone itself; 
how it has generated new forms of mess, confusion and insecurity. It is becoming 
apparent that `economies' that seek to cycle inputs into outputs with greater speed 
and tighter control often confound their own logic. Theorists of `risk society’ such as 
Ulrich Beck (1992, 1995) and Anthony Giddens (1994,1999) have noted how 
industrial modernity’s drive to extend its command over the physical world to ever 
new depths and degrees is revealing unintended consequences – in the form of 
`runaway’ events.  Mishaps such as nuclear meltdowns, chemical spills and 
atmospheric carbon build-up are characterised by `creeping, galloping and 
overlapping despoliation’ which confer on our era a new and frightening profile of 
endangerment (Beck, 1995: 109).  If such events are indicative that matter and 
energy has a tendency to escape from the pathways into which we have tried to 
confine it, so too do the recent misadventures of industrialized animal husbandry 
provide a reminder that life itself is a force which often refuses to stay in the grooves 
and grids we have laid out for it.   
In the `runaway’ or `undelimitable’ event depicted by risk theorists the linear 
relationship of cause and effect is derailed: something enters the equation that was 
not accounted for, something leaves the circuit that was unanticipated. But the 
excess or exorbitance that has come to haunt the modern utilitarian calculus need 
not always be so tragic and fearful. Some philosophers and social theorists have 
found much to affirm amidst the goings-on that exceed the realms of calculativity and 
knowing. They find in the shadow of our projects other ways of being and doing that 
are not - cannot ever be - fully encompassed by the dominant `economic' logic. And 
they seek to make something more of these moments.  
If breakdowns or outbreaks ensure things don’t always go according to plan, 
so too can breachings, ruptures or collisions help change us and our world, 
especially when we look further afield than the kinds of high-tech accidents that 
garner so much media and critical attention. As theorists have recently reminded us, 
it is the other people or things we meet `accidentally', the unanticipated events we 
get caught up in, the pathways that unexpectedly cross our own which often change 
our lives most dramatically. It is when we cease to weigh up the consequences or 
take the usual measures, they add,  that we are most likely to let others draw us out 
of our `selves' and the circles we usually move in. Such transformative openings of 
one to an other are referred to using a number of different concepts -  `giving', 
`generosity', `hospitality', `care', `affection', `love'. So familiar as to seem trite, these 
are also amongst the most ancient of philosophical themes. Revitalised in 
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contemporary thought, they are returning as inescapable and often welcome 
dimensions of ethical, political, legal and economic life.  
It is not simply that we are being called upon to crash through the closed 
circuits of knowledge production or capital accumulation with extravagant gestures of 
altruism. It is as much that we learn to see and acknowledge the relations of giving 
and taking, caring and being cared for, hosting and visiting that are always already at 
play in the more official economies we partake in. In particular, the renewed 
philosophical interest in generosity and generativity draws attention to the embodied 
nature of these openings between selves and others, to the inevitable `debt' that any 
body owes the other bodies who come before and beside it. As feminist philosopher 
Rosalyn Diprose puts it: `insofar as I am a self, the giving of corporeality is already in 
operation' (2002: 54). Whether it’s a matter of picking up new skills, sexual 
pleasuring, or organ donation, Diprose claims, the possibilities of our own 
embodiment are realised through our exchanges with other bodies. Or in the words 
of Thomas Wall, arguing along similar lines, a `self is borrowed, eaten, absorbed 
from others' (1999: 42). 
The field of animal domestication, I want to suggest, offers fertile ground for 
exploring the give and take, the eating and absorption, that links different kinds of 
bodies. While Diprose's notion of `corporeal generosity' focuses on the interplay 
between human bodies, other philosophers have broached the issue of interspecies 
exchanges: raising questions about the responses and responsibilities that might 
arise out of our engagement with other living beings. In this regard, the cross-
disciplinary study of domestication is already rich in traces of `generous' or mutually 
transformative relations between species. In particular, the willingness of researchers 
in the field of animal domestication to consider at once behavioural and somatic 
shifts, intended and unintentional transformations, and changes in humans as well as 
other animals promises much for a conversation with philosophers of `corporeal 
generosity'. 
As Diprose argues, what a body `owes' to other bodies defies any final 
reckoning or settling of accounts (2002: 4). Any opening between bodies is always, to 
some degree, unpredictable, which can make it next to impossible separate out a risk 
from a potentiality. This means, as Derrida notes, that it may be difficult to distinguish 
giving from taking, or to tell a guest from a `parasite' (2000: 59). Where the encounter 
is between different species, as we will see, such undecideables or uncertainties may 
be at their extreme. My excursion into the interspecies give and take of animal 
domestication, then, touches on generosity and affection as sources of creative and 
life-giving transformations. But it also delves into the realm of poisoned gifts: 
exchanges that may be damaging or deadly - including those which are `parasitic' in 
the most literal sense.  To move beyond `restricted economies', I propose, is to give 
other forms of relationality their due - though it is not to imagine that the interface 
between species could ever fully escape violence or violation.  
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<A>Excess and Affect on the Colonial Periphery 
`The gift,’ Derrida writes, `…should overrun the border, to be sure, toward the 
measureless and excessive’ (1992a: 91). My bringing together of the theme of animal 
domestication with the concept of giving or generosity has its origins in an 
engagement with a certain kind of overrunning of borders, a specific form of 
excessiveness, which might at first glance seem a rather perverse point of departure. 
It stems from my encounters with the biological dimensions of European settlement 
in the temperate zones of the southern hemisphere, and in particular with the 
undoing of the domestication process that frequently occurred at Europe’s 
`antipodes’. The attempt to transform the biota and landscapes of the `settler 
colonies’ through the introduction of plant and animal species from other regions was 
a vital and momentous aspect of the colonisation process: it played an important part 
in the integration of these regions into an emerging global economy, and more 
generally it formed a cornerstone of the European project of enlightened and 
progressive improvement of previously `uncivilised’ lands.   
Needless to say, this colonial project has been subjected to considerable 
scrutiny and critique over the intervening years. One of the ways of challenging the 
foundational narratives of colonialism, one that I have been drawn into, is to examine 
how the logic of `enlightened’ change displayed a distinct tendency to undercut its 
own principles or precepts.  The fate of plant and animal introductions, and 
sometimes the very motivation for introducing species from other regions, is one of 
the more striking ways that that actual practices of exploration and colonisation 
contravened the whole idea of laying down a `grid of intelligibility’.  Aside from the 
fact that much of the transmission of `alien’ or `exotic’ life was entirely accidental, the 
impact of intentional introduction – or `acclimatisation’ – can hardly be said to have 
contributed to orderliness or intelligibility. Many acts of acclimatisation were doomed 
to failure through their abject inappropriateness, while others were destined for a 
catastrophically successful proliferation (Clark 2002, 2003).   
The disorderliness, indeed contrariness, of the practice of species 
introduction appears especially pronounced in the event of domesticates which are 
released, or `overrun the border’ of containment of their own volition, and turn `feral’. 
Formerly domesticated animals that established viable breeding populations 
independent of human influence opened themselves to the selective pressures of a 
novel environment, resulting in both behavioural and morphological changes. Feral 
pigs in Aotearoa New Zealand and Australia, for example, grew coarse-haired, 
sharp-snouted, long-legged, razor-tusked and disarmingly fierce, in what seems a 
surprisingly short span (Clark 2004).  While an evolutionary biologist or 
zooarchaeologist might see such changes as the fairly predictable resurgence of 
repressed phenotypes, for a mainstream social scientist such rapid and visible 
mutability in the realm of the `natural’ world may offer more of provocation.   
As a sociologist, the whole dynamic of species introduction - with all its 
shocks and surprises - was a trigger to questioning some of my `inherited’ 
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assumptions about the logic of modernity and modernization. It prompted me to be 
more sensitive towards moments of disorder, opacity and unpredictability, and it 
piqued my interest in forms of `economy’ other than the rational or `restricted’. More 
than this, the active part played by animals in their own de-domestication and the 
transformations that resulted seemed to embody a degree of agency and creativity 
that was much more often attributed to human socio-cultural life, or indeed , was one 
of the characteristics that was supposed to distinguish human existence from an 
`unmotivated’ natural world.  
In this way, my encounters with the unruliness of introduced animal life on the 
colonial periphery drew me into the longer and broader history of domestication, with 
an eye to the constitutive role played by deviations, accidents and irruptions. And it 
propelled me in the direction of disciplines and sub-disciplines that were comfortable 
and conversant with the idea that human and other-than-human forms of life shared 
important capacities for creative and generative interrelations with the world around 
them. Moreover, my sense that a `restricted’ economic vision fails to account 
significant aspects of the interface of humans with other animals – and between other 
animals themselves – has prompted an exploration of others ways of conceiving of 
`transactions’ between species.  
Alongside what is often a rather crude and narrow expression of economic 
interest, tales of the biophysical transformation of the colonial periphery hint at 
alternative motivations or sensibilities.  For a start, some early animal introductions 
seem to have been initially perceived as a kind of gift - whether to later settlers or to 
existing inhabitants. Captain James Cook’s account of his release of breeding pairs 
of pigs around the coast of New Zealand, in this regard, clearly points to a wish to 
benefit both anticipated European colonists and the `Natives’ whom he and his crew 
had met on their voyages (Cook 1961).  So too are there interesting stories of the 
`generous’ reception of previously unencountered species by New Zealand Maori 
and Australian Kooris or Aboriginals. Maori took to pig-hunting and pork with gusto, 
and soon afforded pigs a prominent place in their own inter-tribal gifting, while 
Aboriginals came up with new `dreaming’ stories that incorporated feral cats and 
other free-ranging introductions. In the case of European settlers, while they were 
frequently troubled by the excessive proliferation of introduced species, such 
disapproval was often tempered by affection, and a grudging admiration for the ability 
of introduced species to `make a go of it’ in their adopted home (Clark 1999).  
But perhaps most intriguing of all are the accounts of the experiences of the 
animals themselves, and their behaviour under conditions of novelty and 
estrangement. Farmer and naturalist Herbert Guthrie-Smith, a keen-eyed observer of 
rural New Zealand under colonial transformation, recounts the first arrival of an 
introduced species to his part of the country.  
The attraction of the stag to the spot chosen was doubtless the small herd of 
wild horses strayed from native villages deserted and never afterwards 
repeopled. With them the lonely deer formed one of those curious animal 
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friendships that strayed creatures make, a companionship similar to that of 
another stag which, at a much later date, consorted with the Black Head stud 
bulls, or to that of the first rabbit seen north of Petane, which for several 
seasons accompanied a flock of wild turkeys on the Tangoio run (1999: 337).  
Such anecdotes might well be taken as an anthropomorphising of our fellow 
creatures. But other readings are possible, once we are prepared to accept that the 
dividing line between the `human’ and other animals is a blurry and contingent one.    
For me, strange little incidents like these, while they may not prove much, are 
suggestive of lines of inquiry: they hint that the kind of opening to other bodies that 
we might describe as generous or affective is not the sole prerogative of our own 
species. If such incidents are an example of exchanges that overrun any calculus of 
cost and benefits, so too do they invite us to think of alternative economies of give 
and take as a way of bridging between human and other-than human forms of 
association.  
 
<A> Animals, Affection, and Otherness 
The turbulent, messy conditions of the colonial periphery that I have been speaking 
about may offer clues to vital moments in the `animal interface’ that are harder to 
follow in regions of more established agricultural regimes. In this section, I want to 
pursue the idea, in a more general sense, of domestication as an unrestricted or 
other-than-rational economy. My intention is not so much to discredit the notion of 
more calculating economies, as to help loosen their hold on the western imagination. 
A belief in well-ordered and all-inclusive systems, the quest for a common measure 
to smooth the transactions between different kinds of people and different kinds of 
things, should not be made light of. These are, after all, the underpinnings of the 
political model of democracy, the economic principle of just rewards for labour, and 
the tenet of equality before the law: ideals which many of us probably take for 
granted and few of us would wish to dispense with (see Derrida 1992b). 
It is one thing to appreciate the value of well-computed flows and fair 
exchanges, however, and another to see the rule of utility and necessity as all-
pervading. The  problem with viewing human interaction in this way, critics have 
noted, is not only that it has a tendency to subsume all the activities and processes 
present in the modern world into a singular logic, but also that it projects itself onto  
social worlds outside the sphere of western modernity. In this way, every conceivable 
social transaction begins to look like a precursor or proxy of `the spirit of calculation’ 
(Bourdieu 1997: 235; see also Derrida 1992a).  
Even more tellingly, there has been frequent recourse to the model of a 
restricted economy to explain the workings of the biophysical world. Nature, too, 
comes to be construed as a realm of scarcity and limitation, where resources 
circulate without excess or remainder, every input is carefully recycled, and nothing is 
squandered. `In the mirror of the economic’, writes Jean Baudrillard, `Nature looks at 
us with the eyes of necessity’ (1975: 58). Again, we should be wary of too thoroughly 
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dismissing this idea, and re-erecting a boundary between the social and the natural. 
As ecologists or physicists would contend, certain kinds of circulation and reuse are a 
constant in physical systems. But this need not mean that all expenditure is useful or 
productive (Bataille 1991: 27-33). And neither does the fact that certain practices or 
processes appear to have uses or functions necessarily explain how or why they first 
emerged, as Friedrich Nietzsche pointed out long ago (1956: 209-211).  
The study of animal and plant domestication is one amongst many fields in 
which questions of utility and need have been prominent.  This is hardly surprising, 
given the extent to which famine and malnutrition have stalked our species, and the 
undeniable evidence that agriculture can support many more people per square mile 
than hunting and gathering. While it may be some time since scholars have 
espoused theories of the ascendance of a calculating and motivated `rational man' 
(see Ingold, 2000: 27, 63), we might still discern the traces the restricted economic 
imagination in the theorisation of domesticatory practices. Both Sandor Bökönyi and 
Juliet Clutton-Brock's oft-cited definitions of animal domestication, for example, 
foreground human control or mastery of animals in the interests of profit (see Russell 
2002: 287, Clutton-Brock 1994: 26).  Further, the debate between theorists who 
stress human domination, and those who emphasize the symbiotic or commensal 
dimensions of domestication, seems to hinge on whether the benefits and costs of 
the relationships in question are equally or asymmetrically distributed (O,Connor 
1997, cf Clutton-Brock 1994).  
Alongside the question of how, and for whom domestication `works', however, 
there is a growing willingness to acknowledge that significant moments in the wider 
field of domestication exceed such evaluations. Terry O'Connor, in this regard, 
affirmatively cites Michael Ryder's claim that domestication probably emerged from 
predator-prey relationships: "almost as an ecological accident. It was almost certainly 
not conscious or purposeful" (cited in O'Connor: 1997: 152). In a related sense, 
Stephen Budiansky notes that the human side of the domestication process is 
contingent on biological availability: "humans may select, but only from a set of 
options determined by forces beyond their control" (1999: 50). Offering the timely 
reminder that evolution, as Darwin outlined it, has no goal or plan, he further cautions 
that the motives behind relationships of co-evolution are often opaque or ambivalent 
(1999: 28, 58).  
An alternative to necessity is likewise offered by Temple Grandin and Mark 
Deesing as they speculate about an originary moment in the taming of the wolf - an 
episode involving an encounter between a hunter and a litter of pups:   
The pups are all frightened and huddle close together as he kneels in front of 
the den…all except one. The darkest pup shows no fear of the man's 
approach…. After a mutual bout of petting by the man and licking by the wolf, 
the man suddenly has an idea… (1998: 1). 
Pondering the affective or non-utilitarian beginnings of the process of domestication 
in this way is by no means new. Writing in the 1860s, Francis Galton proposed that 
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animal domesticates were initially raised in the caring and protective manner that we 
now associate with pet-keeping (Anderson, 1998: 122). This view has recently been 
revisited by James Serpell. After considering some objections to Galton's hypothesis, 
Serpell affirms that it is  "…likely that all our currently domestic species, as well as 
many which were never domesticated, began their association with humans in this 
essentially non-economic role" (1989: 18-19).  Speaking more generally about a 
disposition toward animals that he believes can be found wherever humans 
associate closely with other species, Tim Ingold extends this sense of an affective 
relationship. "We might speak of a history of human concern with animals," he writes, 
"in so far as this notion conveys a caring, attentive regard, a `being with''' (2000: 76). 
The acknowledgement of the importance of emotive ties between humans 
and animal domesticates takes a leap forward in Donna Haraway's Companion 
Species Manifesto (2003). Exploring the contemporary and historical relationship 
between `canid' and `hominid', Haraway argues that the disciplinary imperative of 
training can be the basis of a close emotional bond between dogs and their human 
handlers (2003: 61-2).  But the broader point she makes about the communion 
between different species extends beyond the dog-human attachment. The 
`otherness' of species not our own, in this sense, is not taken to be a barrier to 
affective relations, but is seen as a foundation for ethical and emotional relating. 
Haraway delves into "the deep pleasure, even joy, of sharing life with a different 
being", and she has no hesitation about referring to the relationship between humans 
and their companion animals as one of love (2003: 37).  
Considering the potential functions of pet keeping, Serpell observes that, "like 
any activity, the net benefits must be weighed against the costs" (1989: 17). While 
Haraway also points to the advantages and drawbacks of the association with 
`significant other' animals, it is precisely her move away from the necessity of such 
accounting that seems most provocative.  As she would have it, to enter into a close 
relationship with another species is to open a network of unknowable and 
immeasurable outcomes. The human-dog communion, Haraway suggests, is 
paradigmatic of the `restless exuberance' of zoological encounters. It offers a case 
study of `multi-directional flows of bodies and value ' in a contingent history that 
includes play as well as labour, waste alongside loss and gain (2003: 9, 12). 
Haraway's notion of an interspecies affiliation evokes `corporeal generosity' in 
the sense that each participant allows themselves to be drawn into an open-ended 
circuit of affect and transformation.  Though it is concerned with a different sort of 
relationship between species, this sense of multi-directionality and lack of closure 
has important continuities with what I was saying earlier about the unruly generativity 
of animal life on the colonial periphery. It also resonates profoundly with the claims 
Diprose makes about giving. "(I)f the gift opens possibilities for existence", she 
writes, "then its operation rests on not determining anything about who gives what to 
whom ahead of or during an encounter" (2002: 55).  It is not simply that already 
constituted `others' have the option of giving to one another, both Haraway and 
 9 
Diprose suggest, but that our very identities as individuated or discernibly different 
beings arise out of exchanges with those who differ from us. Like it or not, every body 
relies on the generosity of other bodies, not only in the sense of what is corporeally 
bequeathed by parents and forebears, but also through that which is taken on by 
processes of imitation, or incorporated through the material transactions we have 
with others. We are what we ingest, absorb or appropriate, in other words.   
 
<A>The Animal Interface   
A social life that encompasses domesticated animals, in this light, can be seen to rest 
more primordially on a kind of mutual dispossession than on the possession of 
animals by human actors; a letting go of customary precautions and boundary 
maintenance on the part of each participating species.  Whatever benefits and 
utilities might eventually emerge, any ongoing inter-species association, it might be 
argued, hinges on "a gift of the possibility of a common world" (Diprose, 2002: 141).  
This brings to mind the insights of the ethical philosopher Emmanuel Levinas on the 
primacy of a `non-allergic' reaction - a response that renounces violence or hostility - 
in the forging of a relationship with the other (1969: 199). While Levinas reserved his 
concerns for the inter-human realm, his considerations on the significance of the 
`caress', as opposed to the act of grasping or seizing, invite extension to the human 
encounter with animal others. The caress, he suggests, "does not know what it 
seeks", it expresses a desire provoked by otherness that lacks clear purpose or plan 
(Levinas 1987: 89).  
John Llewelyn (1991) takes this `other-than-human' reading of Levinas further 
- building on the significance of the face in the French philosopher's writings.  For 
Levinas, the face - and in particular, the eyes - is the most immediate way we 
perceive vulnerability and need in the other: the face thus standing for the frailty 
inherent in embodied existence (Llewelyn 1991: 63). While he concedes that animals 
suffer, and that the ethical should extend to all living beings, Levinas is nevertheless 
circumspective. The significance of the suffering we witness on the face of the other 
invites a conversation: an opening he is reluctant to extend beyond the potential for 
dialogue of our own species: "The human face is completely different and only 
afterwards do we discover the face of an animal" (Levinas cited in Llewelyn 1991: 
65). On this count, Llewelyn is not convinced. Downplaying Levinas's stress on 
speech, he argues that the face of an animal can appeal to us, even call us into 
question. And in this light he takes inspiration from the poet Rilke, who went so far as 
to claim that "What is outside, we know from the animal's face alone…" (cited in 
Llewelyn, 1991: 157).  Taking his `reanimation' of Levinas in the direction of political 
ecology, Llewlelyn concludes by pointing to our responsibility to preserve the 
conditions for the flourishing of other beings  - an obligation which for him 
encompasses both domesticated and free-ranging creatures (1991: 254-5).   
It is one thing, however, to foreground human responsiveness to appealing 
and vulnerable fellow creatures. It is quite another to speculate about corresponding 
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sensibilities moving in the other direction.  Osbjorn Pearson gives us serious grounds 
for doubt.  "(H)umans are remarkable for the amount of co-operation, sharing, and 
reciprocal altruism that typifies our societies",  he asserts. "A similar trend toward co-
operation and sharing with conspecifics does not characterize domestic animals" 
(Pearson in Leach, 2003: 362). The philosopher Martin Heidegger, whose writings 
Levinas frequently engaged with, was equally forthright. For him, what distinguishes 
animals from humanity is not only their lack of a capacity for thought and language, it 
is also their inability to bestow gifts (Wyschogrod, 1990: 82).  
But a lot rests on how we chose to define `giving'. The sense in which Diprose 
and others constitute the gift - as a kind of excessive and often non-volitional flow 
between bodies - suggests a more inclusive reading of the offerings of other forms of 
life. Similarly playing on the notion of our susceptibility to be moved by otherness, 
Alphonso Lingis proposes that we humans acquire many of our gestures, postures 
and desires through communion with animals. And it is not simply, nor even primarily, 
our glimpses of charismatic free-living fauna that has such affect, so much as the 
ongoing and intimate exchanges we have with more familiar creatures. Lingis has us 
developing our sensual and emotional registers through such experiences as our 
infantile fondling of kittens or lambs, our childhood observations of hens defending 
their chicks, our memories of mounting the "smooth warm flanks of a horse"  (2000: 
36-7).  
Such practices of mimesis and projection offer one way of approaching the 
question of how  "the organization of the body (is) given to and by the corporeality of 
others" in the context of co-dwelling species (Diprose, 2002: 69). Along with 
Llewelyn's notion of the ethical appeal in the face of the animal, however, Lingis's 
unashamed eroticising of our encounters with other creatures may risk alienating 
those with a more scientific approach to the phenomenon of domestication. But there 
are alternative modes of engagement with the interface of humans and associate 
species that seem to substantiate the idea of the mutual affectivity of neighbouring 
bodies - inquiries that draw more on archaeological evidence than discourses of 
ethical philosophy. It is broadly agreed amongst scholars in anthropology and animal 
science that there is a set of characteristics found in domesticated mammals which 
helps distinguish them from free-ranging counterparts. Such changes include loss of 
skeletal robustness, shortening of the muzzle or facial region, and retention of 
juvenile behaviours into adulthood (Leach, 2003: 349). What has frequently been 
passed over in this context, as Helen Leach (2003) has recently noted, is that animal 
domesticates are not alone in such bodily modifications.   
 
<A>Corporeal Generosities  
"We turn into our partners, and even our dogs, just by dwelling with them", Diprose 
observes (2002: 70). Such mutual influence, however, may go well beyond mere 
traffic in gesture and expression.  Leach directs our attention to the parallel between 
the somatic transformations observed in the archaeozoological record of animals 
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going through the early phases of domestication, and changes noted in human 
morphology over corresponding periods - pointing to the shared shift from robustness 
to gracility which is especially evident in the face and head. A key factor in this 
convergence, she suggests, is the cultural modification of the environment in ways 
which protect both humans and their livestock from many of the physical challenges - 
and thus the selective pressures -associated with a more free-ranging existence. 
"For the human, the combination of adoption of a built environment, change in diet 
consistency, and lowered mobility brought about morphological changes similar to 
those seen in domestic animals" (Leach 2003: 360). 
Leach's thesis does not rule out other explanations for changes in bodily form 
of domesticates which imply greater human intentionality, such as the selection of 
smaller, more easily handled animals (Leach, 2003: 350). What it does do, though, is 
to grapple with the thorny and frequently bypassed issue of humankind 
unintentionally `domesticating itself' along with its animal associates. From the 
perspective of an `economy' of corporeal generosity this raises the prospect that by 
`giving' shelter and protection to other animals humans precipitated bodily 
transformations shared with these other species, changes that could not have been 
intended or anticipated.   
But there is an even more provocative sense in which we might draw a 
connection between convergent human-domesticate evolution and the generous, 
receptive attitude to others affirmed in the work of Levinas, Lingis, Diprose and fellow 
ethical philosophers. As Leach points out, a number of the transformations she 
investigates - including `cranio-facial' reduction and general loss of robustness - have 
been linked to the phenomenon of neotony or paedomorphosis - which entails the 
retention into adulthood of certain features associated with juvenility (2003: 354). 
Evidence suggests that these morphological changes are related to non-aggressive 
and tolerant behaviour, which are likewise characteristic of immature animals. This 
conclusion is supported by Belyaev and Trut's account of a silver fox domestication 
project which aimed for docility and tolerance of humans but unexpectedly produced 
accompanying cranio-facial reductions (Leach 2003: 354-5).  
While the connection between neotony and domestication remains uncertain, 
and indeed contentious (see Price 1998: 49), it raises intriguing possibilities for 
drawing together the question of animals `lending' themselves to domestication and 
the issue of the openness of humans to closer bonds with other species. For as 
Konrad Lorenz proposes, humans too display some familiar neotonic characteristics:  
I am convinced that man owes the life-long persistence of his constitutive 
curiosity and explorative playfulness to a partial neoteny which is indubitably 
a consequence of domestication (cited in Grandin and Deesing 1998: 20). 
Stephen Budiansky (1999) agrees that significant features of neotony may be 
present in humans as well as their domesticates. But Budiansky makes the claim that 
the behavioural and somatic changes that characterise neotony are not simply an 
outcome of domestication but an important prerequisite. He argues that, prior to their 
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more structured association, humans and their livestock spent many millennia 
familiarising themselves with each other, driven together by the climatic upheavals of 
the Pleistocene era (1994: 4). Fluctuating environmental conditions, Budiansky 
reminds us, favour life forms that can vacate and colonize ecological niches rapidly: 
which is to say species that are adaptable and opportunistic (1999: 73-5). Such 
conditions, he notes, favour the evolutionary strategy of neotony, which brings with it 
the curiosity and rapid learning ability of the young, including "a non-discriminating 
willingness to associate and play with members of other species" (Budiansky 1999: 
78). The retention into adulthood of these juvenile traits, Budiansky suggests, offers a 
platform for the emergence of the relationship of domestication. And this applies to 
humans no less that their potential domesticates: "The neotony that is part of our 
own evolutionary heritage may have likewise made us more willing to enter into 
relationships with animals other than the highly specialized one of predator to prey" 
(Budiansky, 1999: 80). 
These observations might cast some light on those strange incidents of inter-
specific association that Herbert Guthrie–Smith and others witnessed on the colonial 
periphery: expressions of tolerance or bonding that also occurred under conditions of 
environmental fluctuation and turbulence – this time induced by human activities. 
Having observed the behaviour of animals, both domestic and free-ranging, as they 
confronted unfamiliar objects or conditions, Guthrie-Smith concluded: `Curiosity is by 
no means confined to humanity’ (1999: 304). After a more systematic inquiry, 
Grandin and Deesing make the claim that  there is genetically-based natural variation 
in many free-living animals with regard to responses to novel experience, such as 
encountering humans - with a minority displaying "a quiet exploratory reaction 
without either fear or aggression" (1998: 2). This is the scenario illustrated in their 
hypothetical hunter-meets-wolf cub tale, though it might be added that canid and 
hominid might best be seen as selecting each other - given that the individuals of 
both species seem endowed with exceptional fearlessness and inquisitiveness. 
Taken as a precondition of domestication, then, it is not so much the genetic 
predisposition for placidity and homeliness that appear pivotal, but an openness and 
receptivity to `otherness'.  
In this way, insights from the scientific study of evolution resonate with the  
`non-allergic' response to the other privileged in the writings of ethical philosophers 
like Levinas, Derrida and Diprose - fleshing out the notion that a renunciation of 
hostility is the `gift' from which the possibility of a shared world arises. And though it 
undoubtedly rests on a too literal reading of Levinas, it is tempting also to reflect on 
the primacy of the face, and the resultant accentuation of the eyes, in the 
morphological shifting linked to neotenic non-aggression. But what we might say, 
with more confidence, is that the give and take between heterogeneous species 
exceeds any sense of deliberation or planning: contributing to bodily and behavioural 
changes with a utility that can only ever be grasped in retrospect. Or as Haraway 
puts it in regard to the generative interchange between dogs and humans: "Flexibility 
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and opportunism are the name of the game for both species, who shape each other 
throughout the still ongoing story of co-evolution" (2003: 29).  
 
<A>Poisoned Gifts: Domestication and Pathogen Exchange  
I have been suggesting that a certain strand in western philosophy concerned with 
excessiveness and its expression in the act of giving might be brought into 
convergence with the archaeological and biological inquiry into the emergence of 
animal domestication. But there is a sense in which `gifts' and `generosity' are loaded 
terms, importing an everyday connotation of beneficence that does not always sit 
comfortably in this context. This is especially so when we consider the dangers faced 
by any organismic body which permits itself such intimacy with other bodies that 
mutual influence in behaviour or morphology becomes a possibility. "Corporeal 
generosity", as Diprose puts it,  "is writing in blood that says this body carries a trace 
of the other" (2002: 195). And in this way she reminds us that giving is always risky, 
that the offering or receiving of a gift, by virtue of the potentiality it conveys, is 
inevitably a kind of rupture or violation. Or as Derrida proclaims: "Such violence may 
be considered the very condition of the gift, its constitutive impurity" (1992a: 147).   
The word `gift', Marcel Mauss noted, shares the meaning of poison in the 
Germanic languages, a reminder that the favoured present for the ancient Germans 
was alcoholic (1997: 30). In the annals of close human-animal association, however, 
it is not poisons but pathogens which manifest the dark underside of the generous 
encounter. As William McNeill points out: "Most and probably all of the distinctive 
infectious diseases of civilization transferred to human populations from animal 
herds" (1998: 69).  These "deadly gifts from our animal friends"  - otherwise known 
as zoonoses - include worms, protozoa, bacteria, fungi and viruses (Diamond, 1998: 
207). Arguably, their traffic amongst and between species is no less intrinsic to the 
domestication process than is artificial selection or incidental morphological change.   
Pathogens, we might say, play on the terrain of the exorbitant: they are the 
gift that keeps on giving. Where there is intimacy, there will be microscopic life to-ing 
and fro-ing between partners, and where the parties themselves happen not to be  
conspecifics there is an opportunity for micro-organisms to move permanently across 
species boundaries (see Garrett, 1995: 572-9). But what might be impartial and 
dispassionate survivalism at one level may well blossom out of warmth and 
tenderness at another. It is human “proximity to the animals we love”, especially 
"cuddly species (like young lambs) with which we have much physical contact", Jared 
Diamond notes, which heighten our risk of pathogen transfer (1998: 207, 213).  
In a more general sense, it is the agglomeration of human and animal 
populations that provides the conditions for contagious diseases to take hold.  Such 
social animals as cows, sheep and pigs would already have been reservoirs of 
pathogens prior to domestication; settled agriculture providing the density of hosts - 
both human and domesticate - to evolve and sustain diseases (Diamond 1998: 205-
6). By the same logic, this environment offers rich opportunities for pathogens to 
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jump between species. What Diamond says of measles, a virus likely to have come 
from cattle, might equally apply to other domestic or companion animals: "that 
transfer is not at all surprising, considering that many peasant farmers live and sleep 
close to cows and their feces, urine, breath, sores, and blood" (1998: 206-7). And the 
movement of these infections, as we might expect, is multilateral: from humans to 
livestock, amongst different domesticated species, and frequently overrunning the 
border between domesticates and their free-living relatives (MacNeill 1998: 71).   
Across Eurasia, human populations gradually came to terms with the 
diseases they had exchanged with their livestock, an accommodation achieved 
through the costly selective pressure of successive plagues over thousands of years. 
The settling into endemicism of these infectious diseases was the prelude to their 
devastating introduction to the `epidemiologically naive' populations of lands 
previously insulated by oceans (Crosby 1986: ch 9; McNeill 1998: ch 5).  It has been 
estimated that 95% of the Indian population of the Americas perished in epidemics 
over the century or two following contact with Europeans, a scenario repeated to 
greater or lesser degree in all other of Europe’s `new worlds'  (Diamond 1998: 211).  
As Diamond would have it, the European conquest of these lands and subsequent 
demographic take-overs "…might not have happened without Europe's sinister gift to 
other continents - the germs evolving from Eurasians' long intimacy with domestic 
animals" (1998: 214; see also MacNeill, 1998: 235).  
As a descendent of European settlers in a southern hemisphere colony, this 
catastrophic history has a particular poignancy for me. It is also drives home the point 
that  the enlightening project of modernity not only `overran’ its own logic and 
principles as it spread across the earth’s surface, its very extension was usually 
premised on its shadowy underside of excess and disorder.  And as I suggested at 
the outset of this chapter, the age of poisoned gifts is far from over. Recent years 
have seen the emergence of a new strain of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease - linked with 
Bovine Spongiform Encaphelopathy or `mad cow disease', the frightening but short-
lived SARS epidemic, and numerous irruptions of Avian influenza. 
Yet, for all their terrible toll, we might also acknowledge a kind of `generosity' 
in the way that pathogens take advantage of the proximity and porosity of larger 
bodies. The `trace of the other' that Diprose sees as constitutive of all bodily identity 
is nowhere more literally inscribed that in the bequest of successive micro-organismic 
invasions. Invading viruses have left their mark throughout the living world, with  
hundreds of retro-viruses becoming integrated in the human genome, many of which 
now perform vital defence functions against subsequent infection (Lederberg 2004: 
55). Indeed, evolution - our own as much as that of any other species - is partially 
propelled by infectious micro-organisms. As Haraway reminds us:   
Evolutionary biology posits that we only evolve with our illnesses, and 
that the difference and diversity that comes from infection and contagion 
is what actually allows us to continue to proliferate and survive in a 
variety of environmental conditions on the planet (2000: 22). 
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Just as a generous or hospitable relationship between animal others is premised on 
a withholding of violence, so too does a lasting host-pathogen association depend on 
the way bacteria, in the words of biologist Joshua Lederberg  `withhold their 
virulence' (2004: 55). For a pathogen to survive, it must avoid too rapidly destroying 
its host, and in this regard it is in the interests of both species to evolve towards 
mutual tolerance. “This is what disease as experienced by humans is all about”, 
Lederberg claims “ - the establishment of a foothold so the obliging host will provide 
warm food and shelter and be domesticated to the service of that parasite” (2004: 
54).  Whether we take this metaphorically or literally as a domesticatory relationship, 
it is a cogent reminder that the larger organisms who enter into the association we 
more typically call `domestication' are always already the outcome of `generous' 
encounters: exchanges at once generative and deadly. 
 
<A>Conclusion 
The idea of an embodied generosity hinging on the susceptibility of living beings to 
the `affect' of other bodies helps turn our attention to the open-endedness of 
interspecies relations. It reminds us that the adaptability and creativity of living things 
is not simply an attribute of life in the `wild', and neither is it a capacity that has been 
entirely appropriated and overwritten by human technological practices. Rather, it is 
an ongoing process that is found wherever species come into sustained and intimate 
relationships, whether these are intentional or incidental.  
If taken literally, the idea of a generous and generative `animal interface' - for 
all that it may implicate differentiated species - would seem to imply at least a 
modicum of shared physiological, neurological and limbic faculties. While a 
meaningful encounter between living beings need not necessarily involve volition or 
judgement, mutual recognition calls for a capacity to `read' the other, to register and 
respond to each other's presence.  In this regard, we should not `focus' too strongly 
on sight or the eyes, recalling the extent to which some animals depend on 
acuteness of hearing or scent discrimination and perception of movement (Patton, 
2003: 97). And neither should we prioritise `language', at least in any sense that 
privileges the human experience of this faculty, especially since the linguistic turn in 
philosophy has reminded us that even amongst members of our own species, 
mistranslation and multiple interpretation is rife (see Derrida, 2003).  
Then again, the rich mutual responsiveness of microbial life and larger 
organisms suggests that there are ways of communicating that do not depend on 
anything remotely approximating a common sensory system. The ability of a virus - 
barely even complex or sensate enough to qualify as `living' - to `read' a host's bodily 
makeup well enough to confound its immunological system and to appropriate it's 
mechanisms of cellular reproduction - together with the host's ability to develop novel 
immunological defences to an uninvited microscopic visitor  - hints at just how 
multilayered `recognition' can be. In the words of digital media artist Melinda 
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Rackham, herself a Hepatitis C carrier: `a virus penetrating your core is probably the 
most intimate relation you can have with another species' (2000: 22).  
In our coexistence with disease, virologist Stephen Morse warns us to `begin 
by expecting the unexpected (1994: 325), while philosopher Jacques Derrida, 
addressing our contemporary condition more generally, advises us to `open the 
calculation to the uncalculable' (2001: 259). Neither is telling us not predict, 
deliberate or otherwise weigh up our own interests, but both seem to be cautioning 
about the limits of this kind of `economy', the limits of knowledge and mastery. The 
idea that our best laid plans for controlling the biophysical world have unpredictable 
and incalculable consequences is now a central concern in social theory, and as I 
noted earlier, theorists like Beck and Giddens see this `manufacturing’ of risk as one 
of the definitive features of the current phase of our modernity. `Manufactured risk’, 
as Giddens puts it, `refers to risk situations which we have very little historical 
experience of confronting’ (1999: 26).   
Or have we? My references to the `creeping, galloping and overlapping 
despoliation’ that so often followed from species introductions on the colonial 
periphery, and my more general discussion of the unforeseeable consequences of 
animal domestication in were intended to show that altering the pattern of our 
associations with different forms of biological life has always been risky. Wherever 
bodies come close enough to be of benefit to other bodies, I have been suggesting, 
there will inevitably be a danger of other transmissions and transformations that are 
threatening or deleterious - for there can be no opening of one living being to another 
that is entirely predictable. And in this regard, our era is indeed characterised by the 
threat of the kind of unanticipatable and undelimitable accidents that Giddens, Beck 
and others have described. But so too have many other times and places given rise 
to similar scenarios of risk.  
In this sense, a history or archaeology of domestication that is attuned to the 
inherent excessiveness of  inter-species association at once meshes with and 
perturbs some of the central concerns of contemporary social theory. The expansive 
temporal and spatial scales that feature in studies of domestication, and the relatively 
rich tradition of merging social and biophysical variables, I would argue, helps put the 
more nascent social theoretic concern with the dangers of manipulating life and 
matter into a much broader context. An important part of this wider contextualisation 
is that it gives us time - historical time, evolutionary time – to register and account for 
the potentialities that also inhere in these fraught encounters.  In this regard, then, 
the concept of an embodied generosity seems to offer a way of holding open, at 
once, danger and possibility, the threat of destruction and the chance of generativity. 
If the animal life we depend upon, not to mention our own `animal lives’, is the 
outcome of such generosities, then, along with our fears, we have a lot to be grateful 
for. How to express that gratitude while continuing to satisfy our appetites remains a 
challenge with an open and endless horizon. 
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